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TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE IMPACT ON FDI: TAX HAVENS 
CASE STUDY 
JAN ROHAN* AND LUKÁŠ MORAVEC** 
INTRODUCTION 
Harmful Tax Competition, issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) in 1998, defines the basic criteria for 
identifying tax havens.1 The criteria are described in the following manner: tax-
free or only nominal taxes, the lack of effective exchange of information, lack 
of transparency, and insubstantial activities.2 In 2000, the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (a forum created 
by the OECD) prepared a list of uncooperative jurisdictions (“tax havens”).3 In 
order to remove themselves from this black list, the jurisdictions only had one 
choice: sign at least twelve Tax Information Exchange Agreements (“TIEAs”) 
or Double Taxation Agreements (“DTAs”) with a provision on the exchange of 
information in tax matters.4  
 
* Jan Rohan is a Ph.D. student at the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague. His research is 
focused on the tax havens and the tax planning issue. He works for the General Financial 
Directorate of the Czech Republic where he is responsible for the administrative cooperation in tax 
matters and the international exchange of tax information. 
** Lukáš Moravec is a tax tutor at the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Bohemia and a 
lector at the College of European and Regional Studies in Ceske Budejovice, Bohemia particularly. 
His research work aims at the tax competition and the tax havens’ role on one side and, on the other 
side, he participates in the indirect taxes fraud risk analysis development. 
 1. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 22–23 (1998); see also Jan Rohan & Lukáš Moravec, Tax Information 
Exchange Influence on Czech Based Companies’ Behavior in Relation to Tax Havens, 65 ACTA 
UNIVERSITATIS AGRICULTURAE ET SILVICULTURAE MENDELIANAE BRUNENSIS 721, 721 (2017) 
(Czech). 
 2. OECD, supra note 1, at 23; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. 
 3. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL 
COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 12, 17 
(2000); see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. 
 4. See OECD CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMIN., COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX 
EVASION: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10–11 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/424 
69606.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN88-H62F]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. 
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The OECD is not the only institution that has tried to define tax havens. For 
example, the U.S. Congress,5 Lowtax Network,6 Tax Justice Network,7 and the 
International Monetary Fund8 have issued lists of jurisdictions with preferential 
tax regimes.  
There are also many authors that have studied jurisdictions with preferential 
tax regimes. For example, Kerzner’s research and Addison’s research deals with 
the effect of TIEAs.9 According to Addison’s 2009 study, TIEAs provide 
deficient measures to fight tax havens.10 According to his results, the non-tax 
haven jurisdiction should vigorously pursue “domestic policies targeting tax 
havens” because unilateral action is easier to enforce.11 
Braun and Weichenrieder’s research, as well as our previous research, 
focuses on the effect of tax information exchange measures on taxpayers’ re-
domiciliation (i.e., whether the moment of TIEAs’ and DTAs’ conclusion with 
the offshore jurisdiction is associated with numbers of relocated companies to 
other jurisdictions in order to keep anonymity of their beneficial owners).12 
Braun and Weichenrieder focus on German multinational companies.13 Our 
previous research confirms Braun and Weichenrieder’s theory that firms invest 
 
 5. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2007, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 101(b) (2007) (creating an 
initial list of “offshore secrecy jurisdictions,” consisting of jurisdictions “which have been 
previously and publicly identified by the Internal Revenue Service as secrecy jurisdictions in 
Federal court proceedings”). 
 6. Headline Taxes Rates Around the World, LOWTAX.NET, https://www.lowtax.net/tax-rates/ 
[https://perma.cc/JBN7-Q4DS]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. To learn more 
about Lowtax and their network of tax information websites, see About Lowtax, LOWTAX.NET, 
https://www.lowtax.net/about.html [https://perma.cc/5TC7-SGT4]. 
 7. TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, TAX US IF YOU CAN 36–37 (2005). 
 8. Monetary Exchange Affairs Dep’t, Offshore Financial Centers, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
(June 23, 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm [https://perma. 
cc/S6D8-3R5R]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. 
 9. See DAVID S. KERZNER & DAVID W. CHODIKOFF, The OECD’s War on Offshore Tax 
Evasion 1996-2014, in INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE 53 
(2016) (discussing the effects of TIEAs in the United States and Canada); Timothy V. Addison, 
Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703 (2009) (discussing 
the effects of the TIEAs that the United States has entered into with states considered to be tax 
havens). 
 10. Addison, supra note 9, at 718 (“TIEAs will continue to be ineffective if the United States 
and other OECD member states do not enact more effective legislation to combat tax evasion and 
provide adequate incentives for tax havens to seek out tax evaders.”); see also Rohan & Moravec, 
supra note 1, at 721. 
 11. Addison, supra note 9, at 720–21; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. 
 12. See JULIA BRAUN & ALFONS WEICHENRIEDER, DOES EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
BETWEEN TAX AUTHORITIES INFLUENCE MULTINATIONALS’ USE OF TAX HAVENS? (Centre for 
Eur. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 15-015, Feb. 23, 2015) (examining how the conclusion 
of these agreements affects the investment of German multinational enterprises in tax havens). 
 13. Id. at 1–2. 
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in tax havens not only for low tax rates but also for the secrecy that these 
jurisdictions offer.14  
Cobham, Janský, and Meinzer deal with another perception of anonymity 
that tax havens offer.15 They have developed the Financial Secrecy Index 
(“FSI”), which evaluates jurisdictions pursuant “to their contribution to opacity 
in global financial flow.”16 Zucman focuses on the impact of TIEAs on bank 
deposits in uncooperative jurisdictions.17 Ligthart and Voget’s 2008 study is 
aimed at empirical determinants relating to income tax information exchange 
between the Netherlands and other countries.18  
The effect of tax information exchange measures on portfolio investment in 
preferential tax jurisdictions is discussed by Hanlon’s 2015 study.19 There are a 
number of papers analyzing the TIEAs’ and DTAs’ effects on foreign direct 
investments, for example, Blonigen and Davies,20 Baker,21 Coupé, Orlova, and 
Skiba,22 and Blonigen, Oldenski, and Sly.23 These authors provide more specific 
evidence that implies DTAs and TIEAs may decrease or have no effect on the 
overall value of foreign direct investments in contracted countries.24 It might be 
 
 14. Id. at 26; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722. 
 15. See Alex Cobham, Petr Janský & Markus Meinzer, The Financial Secrecy Index: Shedding 
New Light on the Geography of Secrecy, 91 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 281 (2015) (discussing the 
incentive of financial secrecy in offshore tax jurisdictions). 
 16. Id. at 294–95; Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722. 
 17. See Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate 
Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 144–45 (2014) (discussing effect of agreements to share banking 
information); see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722. 
 18. Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722. See generally JENNY E. LIGTHART & JOHANNES 
VOGET, THE DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-BOARDER TAX INFORMATION SHARING: A PANEL DATA 
ANALYSIS (2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.507.4779&rep=rep1 
&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/42KR-8CGV]. 
 19. See Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew & Jacob R. Thornock, Taking the Long Way 
Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets, 70 J. FIN. 257 
(2015) (reaching the conclusion that “engaging in information-sharing agreements with tax havens 
decreases inbound portfolio investment from those havens”). 
 20. Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI 
Activity, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 601 (2004) (Neth.). 
 21. Paul L. Baker, An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and Their Effect on Foreign Direct 
Investment, 21 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 341 (2014). 
 22. Tom Coupé, Irina Orlova & Alexandre Skiba, The Effect of Tax and Investment Treaties 
on Bilateral FDI Flows to Transition Economies, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS 687 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). 
 23. Bruce A. Blonigen, Lindsay Oldenski & Nicholas Sly, The Differential Effects of Bilateral 
Tax Treaties, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1 (2014). 
 24. Baker, supra note 21, at 362 (concluding that these agreements have no effect on foreign 
direct investment); Blonigen & Davies, supra note 20, at 616 (concluding that these agreements 
“substantially reduce tax evasion practices which were a significant motivation for [foreign direct 
investment]”); Blonigen et al., supra note 23, at 17 (concluding that “there is no robust evidence of 
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caused by multinational companies’ (“MNCs”) re-domiciliation in order to keep 
their anonymity. On the other hand, the MNCs remaining in tax havens after the 
conclusion of TIEAs/DTAs may increase their investments thanks to more 
inviting tax conditions.  
The aim of this Paper is to quantify the conclusive effects of tax information 
exchange instruments on foreign direct investments allocated to the Czech 
MNCs whose owners are from tax havens. This aim is based on Braun and 
Weichenrieder’s 2015 hypothesis. The main research question is whether Czech 
MNCs that remain in preferential tax jurisdictions after conclusion of the 
agreements on exchange of information in collaboration with the Czech 
Republic increase their foreign direct investments compared to non-contracted 
jurisdictions. It means that Czech MNCs prefer favorable tax regimes instead of 
anonymity. 
I.  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
To begin, we have utilized a classification analysis to divide countries into 
preferential and non-preferential tax jurisdictions. The tax havens’ selection has 
been carried out on the basis of concluded and non-concluded TIEAs (and 
DTAs). In the framework’s described analysis, it could be said that the Czech 
Republic has concluded approximately eighty-five DTAs and eight TIEAs since 
late 2014.25 
In order to determine the TIEAs’ and DTAs’ effect on foreign direct 
investments allocated to tax havens, the Difference-in-Differences Method (dif-
in-dif) is being applied. The analyzed data was obtained from the Ministry of 
Finance of the Czech Republic and the Czech National Bank.26 After the dif-in-
dif method, the synthesis of findings was carried out in order to quantify and 
explain the impact of TIEAs and DTAs. 
  
 
an average positive effect” of these agreements on foreign direct investment); Coupé et al., supra 
note 22, at 709 (concluding that “tax treaties do not reveal any robust effect on FDI flows”). 
 25. Int’l Tax Dep’t, Double Taxation: Overview of Valid Contracts, MINISTRY FIN. CZECH 
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/legislativa/dvoji-zdaneni/prehled-platnych-smluv 
[https://perma.cc/UN2L-WNXX]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722. 
 26. MONETARY & STATISTICS DEP’T, CZECH NAT’L BANK, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN 2012, at § 4.2 (2014); STATISTICS & DATA SUPPORT DEP’T, CZECH NAT’L BANK, FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 2014, at §§ 3, 4 (2016). 
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Jurisdiction Entry into force 
British Virgin Island 12. 19. 2012 
Jersey 03. 14. 2012 
Bermuda 03. 14. 2012 
Isle of Man 05. 18. 2012 
Guernsey 07. 09. 2012 
San Marino 09. 06. 2012 
Cayman Islands 09. 20. 2013 
Andorra 06. 05. 2014 
Table 1: The list of concluded TIEAs with the Czech Republic as of the end of 
2014 (Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic).27 
The categorical periods are 2012 (the period marked as “before” concluding 
an agreement) and the third quarter of 2014 (the period marked as “after” 
concluding an agreement). Jurisdictions are divided into two groups. The first 
group, marked “Control,” includes foreign direct investments allocated to the 
Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential jurisdictions without any DTA 
or TIEA concluded with the Czech Republic (in the monitored periods). In the 
second group, called “Treatment,” there are foreign direct investments allocated 
to the Czech MNCs whose owners come from preferential tax jurisdictions that 
the Czech Republic had not concluded any agreements for exchange of 
information in the period “before.” However, in the period marked “after,” the 
agreement with these jurisdictions was concluded by the Czech Republic. 
A. Model Description 
The proposed model of the TIEAs’ and DTAs’ effect uses the following 
equation and variables: 
Yst = α * x0t + β * T + γ * S + δ * T * S + ust 
Yst ..... is the outcome of interest (amount of foreign direct investments) 
α ....................................................................................... is the constant 
x0t ................................................................................. is the unit vector 
β .............................................is the parameter of exogenous variable T 
T ....................................................... is the time period dummy variable 
γ .............................................. is the parameter of exogenous variable S 
 
 27. Int’l Tax & Customs Cooperation Dep’t, Double Taxation: Overview of TIEA Agreements, 
MINISTRY FIN. CZECH (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/legislativa/mezinarodni-spoluprace-
v-oblasti-dani/prehled-dohod-tiea [https://perma.cc/QA94-GBKH]; see also Rohan & Moravec, 
supra note 1, at 722. 
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S ................. is the dummy variable that captures possible differences 
between the treatment and control groups (conclusion or not conclusion 
of the agreement) 
δ ...................................................................... is the parameter of T * S 
T * S ........... is the product of the dummy variables for purpose to 
capture the required effect 
ust ..................................................................................... is the residue28 
The variable “S” indicates the type of group. In the above model, there are 
two groups, “Treatment” and “Control.” The variable “S” is binary, i.e. S ∈ 
{0,1}.29 For the Control group, the variable “S” takes the value of zero. For the 
Treatment group, the variable “S” takes the value of one. The variable “T” 
denotes the time period, which is divided on pre-treatment period, i.e. the period 
before agreement’s conclusion, and the post-treatment period, i.e. the period 
after agreement’s conclusion.30 “T” is also a binary variable. The main purpose 
of this model is to discover the conclusive effect of switching “S” from zero to 
one.31 The variable “Yst” represents foreign direct investments allocated to the 
Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential jurisdictions for a particular 
value of “S” in period “T.”32 
The equation’s modification is needed in order to measure estimations. In 
the equation there are numbers filled depending on the time period and group’s 
type. Subsequently, the constant and the unit vector are added. Finally, the 
equation can be estimated. 
B. Results 
On the basis of the mentioned equation the following parameters have been 
estimated: 
α .................................................................... takes the value of 458.829 
β .................................................................. takes the value of -203.547 
γ ..................................................................... takes the value of 493.614 
δ .................................................................... takes the value of 458.580 
In order to calculate the impact of TIEAs/DTAs, the parameters mentioned 
above are put into the model. The mentioned values are denoted in millions of 
Czech Crowns (“CZK”). For a better overview of the results, see Graph 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 28. Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 723. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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Graph 1: Dif-in-dif model in graphical view (authors’ own elaboration using the 
Czech Ministry of Finance and the Czech National Bank data). 
The Control line illustrates the Control group, which includes foreign direct 
investments allocated to the Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential 
tax jurisdictions that have no agreement for exchange of information with the 
Czech Republic in period “T0” and “T1.” Given that, there is a decrease in the 
amount of foreign direct investments by 55.6%, i.e., 458.829 million CZK to 
255.282 million CZK. 
Graph 1 depicts two other lines, Group A and Group B, that show the 
Treatment group, but each line is based on different assumptions. Both lines at 
period “T0” start at the same point—952.443 million CZK—due to non-
conclusive TIEAs or DTAs. The Group B line at the period “T1” shows a 
hypothetical situation without any change of foreign direct investments allocated 
to the Czech MNCs despite the concluded DTAs or TIEAs.  
This explains subsequent decreases from 952.443 million CZK in foreign 
direct investments to 748.898 million CZK. As can be seen in Graph 1, the 
Group B and Control lines are of equal measure because they depict the same 
situation and there is the same increase by β (203.547 million CZK) between the 
period “T0” and “T1.” 
On the other side, the Group A line illustrates the real situation and the real 
development. This line shows the amount of foreign direct investments allocated 
to the Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential tax jurisdictions that 
had no agreement in the period “T0,” but in period “T1” the agreements have 
concluded. Because of the DTA’s/TIEA’s conclusion there is an increase of the 
amount of foreign direct investments from 952.443 million CZK to 1207.476 
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million CZK. This increase cannot be considered as the final effect of concluded 
agreements on exchange of information. 
The final impact is quantified by comparing the Group A line with the Group 
B line. The result is shown by δ. The final effect demonstrates that if there were 
not any concluded TIEAs and DTAs the amount of foreign direct investments 
would be 748.898 million CZK. After the conclusion of TIEAs or DTAs, the 
amount of foreign direct investments increases to 1207.476 million CZK. The 
result of conclusion of TIEAs/DTAs is a significant increase of foreign direct 
investments by 61.2%. 
For transactions that are carried out with non-contracted jurisdictions (i.e., 
jurisdictions that do not conclude instruments for exchange of information), the 
Czech Republic applies a 35% rate withholding tax.33 If there is a conclusion of 
such instruments, the taxation of transactions is amended by specific provision 
or the tax is withheld by a 15% rate.34 These abovementioned results show that 
Czech MNCs remaining in preferential tax jurisdictions after conclusion of 
TIEAs/DTAs increase the amount of their foreign direct investments (i.e., they 
prefer favorable tax regimes instead of anonymity).  
II.  DISCUSSION 
Our findings are mostly in agreement with Braun and Weichenrieder’s 
2015,35 Baker’s 2014,36 Coupé et al.’s 2009,37 and Blonigen et al.’s 201438 
results. However, they mentioned that TIEAs and DTAs have had either a 
negative impact or no impact on foreign direct investments because of MNCs’ 
re-domiciliation from tax havens to another non-contracted jurisdiction after the 
conclusion of tax information exchange instruments.39 On the other hand, our 
results prove that Czech MNCs remaining in preferential tax jurisdictions after 
conclusion of TIEAs/DTAs increase an amount of their foreign direct 
investments. The MNCs benefit from better tax conditions resulting from DTAs 
or TIEAs. The opposite effects, compared to the authors above, could be caused 
by differences in the national tax systems. For instance, the Czech Republic has 
 
 33. Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 36(1)(c) (Czech); see also Czech Republic: 
Corporate Withholding Taxes, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (May 25, 2017), http://taxsumma 
ries.pwc.com/ID/Czech-Republic-Corporate-Withholding-taxes [https://perma.cc/XG7Z-P95D] 
(showing that countries with which the Czech Republic does not have an enforceable DTA or TIEA, 
are subject to a 35% withholding tax). 
 34. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 33. 
 35. See BRAUN & WEICHENRIEDER, supra note 12, at 26. 
 36. See Baker, supra note 21, at 362. 
 37. See Coupé et al., supra note 22, at 709–10. 
 38. See Blonigen et al., supra note 23, at 17. 
 39. Baker, supra note 21, at 362; Blonigen et al., supra note 23, at 17; Coupé et al., supra note 
22, at 709. 
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a 35% rate withholding tax on transactions with non-contractual jurisdictions.40 
This tax should have the dissuasive effect to transfer funds into tax havens. 
According to Braun and Weichenrieder’s 2015 research,41 Krejčí’s 2016 
research,42 and our previous research, approximately 44% of MNCs, whose 
owners are from preferential tax jurisdictions, are seated in tax havens for 
anonymity protection reasons.43 The rest of MNCs stay there for other reasons, 
for example, tax planning. We do not agree with Addison’s 2009 study, which 
claims that TIEAs are “symbolic” and provide insufficient additional 
measures.44 Our research and Braun and Weichenrieder’s 2015 results show the 
opposite.45 However, we agree with Addison and Kerzner that countries should 
focus on their domestic law.46 Countries have several options for improving their 
national tax law. Many countries have inclined to the implementation of 
particular BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) action plans, developed by 
the OECD, as the best way to combat tax havens. 
CONCLUSION 
This Paper identifies the significant effect of tax information exchange on 
foreign direct investments allocated to the Czech MNCs whose owners are from 
preferential tax jurisdictions. The research proves that Czech MNCs, remaining 
in tax havens after conclusion of DTAs/TIEAs, increased their foreign direct 
investments. Foreign direct investments have increased approximately by 61.2% 
after TIEAs’/DTAs’ conclusion. This situation can be explained as a benefit in 
light of better tax conditions that DTAs offer for Czech MNCs, whose owners 
are from contractual jurisdictions. On the other hand, there is a decrease of  
55.6% in foreign direct investments at control group. It could be caused by the 
35% withholding tax, which is applied by the Czech Republic on transactions 
directly transferred to non-contracted jurisdictions47 (i.e., jurisdictions that have 
 
 40. Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 36(1)(c) (Czech); see also 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 33. 
 41. BRAUN & WEICHENRIEDER, supra note 12, at 26. 
 42. Petr Krejčí, Senior Consultant, Bisnode, Presentation at the International Structures – 
Adaption to Current Legislative Changes Conference (Apr. 24, 2016) (printed materials distributed 
at Conference on file with author). For information about the Conference, please visit 
https://www.akont.cz/nase-znalosti/seminare-prednasky-a-konference.html/84_2025-mezinarod 
ni-struktury-%E2%80%93-adaptace-na-aktualni-legislativni-zmeny [https://perma.cc/779T-87 
FD]. 
 43. Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 724. 
 44. Addison, supra note 9, at 704. 
 45. BRAUN & WEICHENRIEDER, supra note 12, at 26. 
 46. KERZNER & CHODIKOFF, supra note 9, at 66–67 (suggesting that jurisdictions with bank 
secrecy laws need legislation permitting greater access to bank information in order combat tax 
evasion); Addison, supra note 9, at 720. 
 47. Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 36(1)(c) (Czech); see also 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 31. 
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not signed the instruments on exchange of information yet). These transactions 
flow to non-contractual jurisdictions indirectly (i.e., through jurisdictions that 
do not withhold tax). The offshore non-contractual jurisdictions are mainly used 
for anonymity and financial secrecy. At a general level, taxpayers, who want to 
keep their anonymity after DTAs’/TIEAs’ conclusion, are relocated to another 
non-contractual jurisdiction. Those who do not prefer anonymity remain in 
contractual jurisdictions and benefit from better tax conditions.  
There is an opportunity for further case study focused on MNCs’ anonymity. 
Thanks to an increased number of jurisdictions participating in the Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and strengthening 
automatic exchange of information, it will be more difficult to stay anonymous. 
These instruments give the tax authorities new ways to obtain information like 
beneficiary ownership, tax planning schemes, bank account information, etc. 
The future research will be targeted on new measures used by MNCs to keep 
their anonymity. 
 
